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EVE OF 
V, 1, LENIN 
IEDrTOR'S FOREWORD 
TEE ever deepening the sharpening economic 
disorganisation in the disintegration of 
to tbe B ~ M &  
!he petty-bour ois mass foIlowing 
led Leain to deche at the end of Septmk,  1917: 
"We have before t~ all the objective prerequiaitea for a succemful 
uprising." From this point on he premed with determination for 
the commencing of the n- preparations for the seizure of 
pmu. At this critical pod, howwer, he waa deprived of p e r m d  
articipation in the wor of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik 
!arty where the final decisions regarding the armed up had 
to be made, Living in hiding on a atdctly conapirative ha=., 
nevertheless, carried on am energetic correspondence with the Bol- 
shevik leadera in Petrograd, presenting his vim on werg important 
phaaa of the qudm of the uprising. 
At the beginning of the revolution lienin had to wage a struggle 
1 
againat some leading BoIsheviks for a correct ap raisal of the 
nature of the revolotim and the r6le of the ~ e h d  Party. (See 
The Tmks o/ tlie ProLarLtt in Om L r e u o W n  and The A r i g  , 
Conference, Little h i n  Library, Vola. 9 and 10.) SimJarIy, wgfll I 
tbe revolution had reached the stage which made the reaIisation 
of the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" a certainty, Lenin again 
ewountered an opposition which he had to overcome to aave the , 
Party from making the historid blunder of miwing the propitious 
mome~t for the transfer of power to the Swiets. I 
In bis communications to the Central Commim after the liquida- 
tion of the Kornilav revolt, Lenin insisted upon a decision in favour 
of the uprising, but h a 1  action was being delayed because of the 
dipiaon of opinion in the cormnittee. Not until the meeting of tbe 
Central Committee on October 23, with Lenin atten , w a  find 3 decision taken. k i n  reported on the timeIineas of e uprising, 
showing that the BoMevik~ had w c u d  the majority amung the 
workera, that the 7 ta were rising throughout the land, while at the same t h e  erensky was plotting to behead the revolution b 
huniDg over Petrograd to the Gennam. In the resolution, whi 1 
he wrote, LRnin declared that "armed uprising was irrevihbIe and 
has fully matured." The resolution was adopted with Kamenev 
and Zinoviev voting winst it, while Stalin and. otberar mergetidy 
- - 
eu ported Lenin. 
fn hi. letter "Marxism and UpMng" which hegins this collection 
writtan Septmba 2627, Lenin anawers the charge that the ~ o l :  
&& were BIanquisfs, explains why h e  uprising during the July 
8 
2 would have been premature, while the KorniIov revolt and its eat have helped to mature the situation. He a h  arguw for 
Warx's conception that "uprising is an art" and that it must be 
treated a~ such. In hia other lettere Lxb polemises against 
b w n e v  and Zinoviev and their following, particularly against 
their policy of watchful waiting and a g h t  their conception of the 
file. of the 3oIshevik Party as the Left Wing in the Comtihrent 
Assembly when the latter is convened. With devastating criticism 
be wear against their contentions that the Bolsheviks were isalated 
end not strong enough alone to undertake the uprising; that the 
Gemam were not threatening Petrogad and the bourgeoisie would 
not dare to sacrifice it; tbat it would be better to wait until the 
counter-revoIution started and then "sbow them"; that the revolu- 
tionary st irr inp in other warring comtrie~ were et of small c o w  
quenm and the uprising in Russia could not ai B them, but on the 
am~trary, injure them, if it were not successful; that Petragrad had 
rovisiom only for two or three days and that the insurrection would 
Ee &med out; that the soldiers might turn against the Bolsheviks 
if p a c e  was not secured after the mizure of power; and, above all, 
that the mama were not in the mood to go into the streets to fi ht 
for power. The opposition, which still clung to their theory t fat  
the bourgeois-democratic revolution had not run its c o u w  warned 
that the attempted u rising would spell disaster to the Party and 
arrest the prograa o ! the revolution. 
Only one week was required to completely demolish the defeatiet 
arguments of Kameaev and Zinoviev. Lenin was at the helm and 
he was deer& the revolution on its appointed course and the 
BoIshevik Party toward the fulfilment of its wpreme !a& and duty 
to the Ruasian and international proletariat. On November 6th 
he wrote that 'Cunder no drcmnstanm is power to be left in 
the hands of Kerensk and Co. until the 7th, by no means!--but 
that the matter must a 5 aoluteIy be decided this evening or tonight" 
Hayin masted the leaeon that "uprising is an art," and having 
carried Lough ths necrsssry preparations, the various Bolshevik 
or anisations moved with military precision at the command of the 
hefmman, and power was transferred to the representatives of 
workers, mIdiera and peasants, before the dawn of the 7th. The 
Military Revolutionarp Committee which was in temporary control, 
turned over all state power to the 2nd Congress of Sovieta, which 
opened that day. The Soviet Government was formed, with k i n  
as head of the first Socialist Soviet State. 
The Bolshwik Party, first the leader of the advanced section of 
the working c l w  became the acknowledged poLitica1 leader of the 
Soviet Republic. Steeled in the October dam it guided the eountty 
through wunter-revoIution, famine, economic ruin, and sabotage, 
to victqr over all the internal enemies of the revolution, to a firm 
rule of t i  e proletatian and p a a n t  m d e  foundation for tbe 
building of Socialism and for the establishment of a clamless society. 
ON THE EVE OF OCTOBER 
MARXISM AND UPRISING 
AMONG the moat vicioue and perhape most widwpread distortions 
of Marxism practiced by the prevailing "Smialist" parties, is to be 
found the opportunist lie which says tbat preparations for an up* 
ing, end generally the treatment of an u p w  as an art, is "Blan- 
d=* 
B d ,  the Ieader of opportunism, long since gained sad 
notoriety by accusing Marxism of Blanquism; and our pr-t 
opporhmhts, by shouting about Blanqubm, in reality do not in any 
way improve or "enrich" the meagre "ideas" of Elernstein. 
To amuse Marxists of Blanqub for treating uprising as an art! 
Can there be a more flagrant distortion of the tnrth, when there t 
not a single Marxist who denies tbat it was Marx who e q d  
h i d f  in the most ddnite, precise and categorical manner on thii 
=re; that it waa Marx who called uprising nothing but an art, 
who mid that uprising mud be treated as an art, &a& one must 
gdn the first s u m  and then p d  from aucceas to sacma with- 
out stopping the oflendwe againat the enemy and making use of hia 
confusion, etc., e.k 
To be s u d u 1 ,  the uprising must be Based not on a oonspiracy, 
not on a party, but on the advanced c k  This is the fmt point. 
The must be based on the revoIntionary upsurge i f  the 
p p 1 e .  This is the second point. The upriaing must be based on 
the cmcid in the h i ~ o  ry of the maturing revolution, when the 
activity of the vanguard of the people ia at its height, when the 
d & t w m  in the ranks of the enemies, md in the ranks of the weuk, 
h a l f - h d ,  d e & d  f r i e n d s  of the revol&n are at M r  high- 
eat point, This ia the third point. It is in pointing out &me tbree 
conditiolla as the way of approaching the qaestiatl of an uprising, 
that Marxiam differs from Blaaquim. 
' Tho teacbinp o f  the French ravolntiunist, Angum Blunqni (1805-188x3 
ths overthmP of the &g poaa through secrat plota of a few 
d n t l o n k n  rethw thpn dmwh prepmion and arganiation af the manem 
led bp r rsrrolonionarg partf.-Ed 
II 
0 n e a ~ ~ I I ~ ~ e x i 8 t , h t o d I & t b t r e a t h ~ p ~  
~~ and the ~evo1utim. 
moment mad he r a m p i d  as the one 
the party to mmgnbe the up- aa 
of the day by the c o r n  of objective events, md 
an art--to &ow this, ft will perhaper be best to 
of comparison and to draw a paralId kmem July 
a d  the Sap* daya* 
July 1617 it was poeaible, withe* tnmpadrg against h 
to put the -tion dm: it wouId ham more proper 
power, aiace OIM enemies would anyway m s e  ue of moIt 
power at that t h e ,  because there wew. still lading the ob 
mditions for a victorioas tapriskg. 
sl3. 'We did not yet have W d  w the clam that is the vangaard 
R ,a. the revohtioa We did mot yet have a majority among the mb and ddiers of the ca@&. Now we have a majority in 
' && Smi& I t  was created only by the h i m  of Jdy and A@, 
i, hy dm -rim of ruthb. pmishmmt meted out to tbs BOI- 
I and by the experienca d the K d w  affair. I -3, At that time &era WIU no gwrarel revoIutionary a p q e  of 
'&e pmpk Now there is, after fie Komilov affair. Thia hi prooen 
by dm situation in the provinces and by the aehme of power by the 
- * i n n u n * l d ~  
I - *& At that time thm were no twciU&m on a general, 
I -1 scale among out and moug tha undecided pettp 
htqphb. NOW' the vacillations are enormws; rmr main eaemy, 
I dm h p d d h  of the A I L  aad of Qs -Id (for the "Allid' are 
at the head af world imperialium), haw hgau ta vaninate h w e m  
- *rat to a victory and a separate against Rda. Om petty- 
k q p o h  demrwra~ having o b v i d y  loat &sir majority among 
&e p p t e ,  have begun to vacillate e n o d y ,  rejecting a bloc, 
b., a mIiti011 with tha Cadek 
4 This is why an uprising on July 16-17 d d  have h n  an 
arror: we would not have rebined power sither physically or politl- 
dl?. Not phpically, in ~pitt of the fact that at min m o w  
btmgmd wau in our hI, baoatlse our workers and m l d i i  would 
~hevefwrgl i tddi tdat that thfortheaakeof  haldhgPetro- 
a ~ ~ r a d ~ i n J d y d d m d a f ~ o f t h e K o m i l w  
~~~~ 
I 
grad; at that h e  people bad not yet become so "brutalid"; 
there was not in existen= such a burning hatred both towards the 
Km*, and towards h e  Tmretelis and Chernovs; and our own 
people were not yet hardened by the experience of the Bolsheviks 
being persecutd, while the Socialist-Reuolutionarim and Men&& , 
v i b  took part in the persecuting. 
We could not have retained power July 1617 politically, for, 
&fore the Kornibv aflair, the army and the pmhces could and 
would have marched against Petrograd. 
Now the picture ia entirely different. 
We have back of us the majority of a class that is the vanguard 
of the revolution, the vanguard of the people, and is capable of 
drawing the massea along. 
We have back of urn a majody of the people, for C k o v ' s  resig- 
nation, far from being the o d y  aign, is only the most striking, the 
most outstanding sign showing that the peasantry will not receive 
hd from a bloc with the S.-R's, or from the 5.-R.'s themdves. 
And in this lies the essence of the popular character of the revo- 
lution. 
We are in the advantageous position of a party which knows its 
road PerfectIy well, while imperialism as a whale, as we11 as tbe 
entire bloc of the M e  and the S.-R.'a, is vacillating in an 
extraordmary mauner. 
Victory is assured to us, for the people are now very close to 
desperation, and we are showing whole people a sure way out, 
having demonstrated to the whoIe people the significance of our 
leaderahip during the "Kornilov day%'' and then having oflered the 
blbc pditicians a compromise which they rejected at r time when 
heir vacillatiom continuid nninterruptedIy. 
It would be a very great error to &ink that our compromim offer 
haa not yet been rejected, that the  demo^ Conference*' + still 
may accept it. The compromise was offered from party to prties.  It 
could not have been offered othemim. The paies  have rejected it. 
The h m a h  Conference ia nothing but a conference. One muat 
not forget one thing, namely, that this conference does not repre- 
sent the majority of the revolutionary people, the poorest and most 
embittered peasantry. One must not forget the self-evident truth 
that this canference repremts a minority of the people. It would 
Called by ths llEtreneltg governmeat in the attempt to wnre a broader bast 
among the m y  bonrgeoiaie following the Kornilw revol+l. 
I 
C 
be a very great error, a vary great parIiamentary idiocy on oar part, 
if  we were to treat the Democfatic Conference as a parliament, for 
erraa if it were to proclaim itself a parliament, the sovereign parlia- 
ment of the revolution, it would not be able to d e d e  anythiag. 
The decision lies oarde of it, m the workare' d o n e  of Petro- 
grad and Moscow. 
We have before ue all the objective prerequisites for a au-fuI 
apxiaing. We have the advantap of a situation where only our 
h r y  in an upriaing will put aa end to the most painfuI thing on 
sarth, the vaeiIIations that have sickened tbe people; a ahation 
where o d y  our victory in an uprising wiU p u  an end to the game 
of a separate peace against the revolution by openly offering a more 
camplete, more just, mom immediate peace in favour oJ the revo- 
Intion. 
Only our party, having won a victory in an uprising, con ~ a v e  
Petrograd, for if our offer of p e w  is rejected, and we obtain not 
men s truce., then we shall becoma "defemskk," then we dm11 p h  
oumlves at the head of the war patlbea, we sbdl be the most "war- 
ring" party, and we &all carry on a war in a truly revolutionary 
manner. We aha11 take away from the capitalists all the bread and 
all the ahw. We ahall leave them crumbs. We shall drea them 
in in &shoes. We shall send all the bread aad aU the ahom to the 
f r o a  
I And then we shall save Petrogrsd 
I The resourceg botb material and spiritua1, of a truly revolution- 
I ary war are still immense in Ruseia; there are ninety-nine chancm t 
I in a hundred that the k a n a  will at leaat grant us a truce. And 
i to sw a trws at p n a t  a- to -guts the w ~ e  maru. 
Having mgniaed the absolute d y  of an uprising of the ! w o r h  of ~ m g r . d  l e d  MOM for the u ~ c  of saving the mo 
j lntion and of eaving Russia from being "qarately" divided among 
the imperialists of both coalitions, we must f i ~  adapt our poIitica1 
factia at the conference to the conditionsr of the maturing uprising; 
mondly, we must prove that we accept, and not only in w o r k  the 
idea of Marx about the necessity of mthg uprising as an art. 
At the eonfereuce, we must immediately consolidate the BoIahevik 
f-on without worrying about numbers, without being afraid of 
I 1- the vacillators in the camp of the vaciIlating: they are mom 
I 8 
d u I  &re to the cause of revolution thtm in tbe camp of the rserr 
lute and murageons fightere. 
We mwt compose a brief dwlaration in the name of tha 1301. 
shevika in which we sharply emphask the irrelevance of long 
the irreIevanw of "speeches" generally, the n d y  of 
quick action to save the molution, the absolute n-ity of break- 
ing completely with the bourgeoisie, of rxrmpleteIy ousting the whole 
preeent government, of completely severing relatiom with the Anglo- 
French imperial* who are preparing a "aepmte*' paffition of 
h i a ,  the n e w d y  of all power immediately passing into the h d a  
of r e v o h i o m y  democracy headed by the r e v o l ~  prok- 
f u d .  
Our declaration must be the briefat and sharpmt formulation 
of this conclusion; it must connect up with the points in the pro- 
gramme of peace to the people, land to tbe peaganb, confiscation 
of scandalous profita, and a balt to the scandalous d-e to pro- 
dudon done by the capitaliata. 
The briefer, the sharper the declaration, the better. Only two 
more important points muat be clearly i n d i d  in it, namely, that 
the people are tired of vaciIlationa, that they are tortured by the 
lack of dedsivenees on the part of the S,-R.'s and Mensheviks; and 
that we are definitely severing relatiom with these pwties h u a e  
they have betrayed the revolution. 
The other point. In offering an immediate peace without amma- 
tions, in breaking at once with the Allied imperialists and with all 
imperialists, we obtain either an immediate truce or a going ovex 
of the entire revolutionary proletariat to the side of defence, and 
a truly j u g  truly revolutionary war will then be waged by revolu- 
tionary democracy under the leademhip of the proletariat. 
Having made tbis declaration, having appealed for decisbm and 
not talk; for achns, not writing resolutions, we must pwh out 
whole fraction into the factohs and barracks: itn place is there; 
tbe pulw of life is there; the source of saving the revolution is 
these; the moving force of the Democratic Conference is here. 
In heated, inrpdoned speeches we must make our programme 
clear and we must put tbe question thia way: either the conierenm 
accepts it fully, or an uprising foflowa There is no middle course. 
Delay is impoesible. The mo1ution b perishing. 
Having put the quation this way, having w-ated our entire 
a 
fraction in the factories and barracks, we shdl comscbIy esbimate 
the bed moment to begin the uprising. 
And in order to treat uprising in a Marxist way, i.e., M an art, 
we must at the same time, without losing a ahgle moment, organisa 
the staff of the insurrectionary detachments; deaigaate tbe form; 
move the loyal regiments to the moa impo-t points; eurromd the 
Alexander theatre; occupy Peter and Paul Fo-; arrest the gen- 
eral at& and the government; move against the miI i tq cadets, 
the Wild Diviaioq* etc., such d e t a h t a  as will die rather &an 
allow the anemy to move to the rrentre of the city; we m u  mobibe 
tbe armed workem, dI them to a lad &perate battle, m p y  at 
once tbe telqraph and telephone stations, place wr staff of the 
upriaing at rhe cmtrd telephone station, m e c t  it by wire with all 
the factories, the regheats, the points of armed fighting, etc. 
Of course, thia is a11 by way of an example, to illusgrate the idea 
tbst at the present moment it is impossible to remain loyal to the 
revolution without ~ e a t h g  up* ~rs an &. 
Written Sepbmbm 26-27, 2917. I I 
First pnblisbed in 1921 in  the ma&w PrPl#arsha %&im';%. k 
TFE CRISIS KAS MATURED 
T a m  is no doubt that the beginning of October baa brought us 1 
to the greatest turning point in the history of the Russian and, ac- 1 
cotding to all appearan% also of the world revolution. 
The world workers' revolution ~tarted with the actions of in&- 1 
ddualr who, by their umweming courage, repraented everything 
hone.& that has survived the decay of official "Socialimm,'' which is 
in reaIity social&uvinim. Iiebknaeht in Germany, Adler in Ant+ 
tria, MacLean in EngImd4m~ are the beet known nruaes of those 
individual heroes wh3 took upon t h d l v e s  the d X d t  role of 
forerunners of the worId revolution. 
A second stage in the b o r i c  preparation for this revolution wm 
a broad maw ferment which d the form of a qlit in the 
officid @ea, the form of illegal publications and of etreet demon- 
strations. The protest against the war g r e - a n d  b e  n& of 
victims of governmental persecutions aIm grew. The prisons of 
w r i e s  famed for tlteir lawfulness and even for their freedom, 
I 
Germany, France, Ttaly, England, began to be filIed wi th  mree 
and hundreds of internationalists, opponeats of the war, advoeate~ 
of a workerd revolution, 
Now the third stage has come, which may be called the eve of the 
revolution. Mass arrests of party leaders in free Italy, and par- 
ticularly the beginning of mutinies in the German army, are un- 
doubted symptoms of the great hrtning point, fie ayniptom of the 
cue of revolution on a world scale. 
There ir no doubt that even before this, there were in Germany 
individual cases of mutiny in the army, but those cases were so 
mall, BO isohted, so weak, that it waa possible to huh them up, to 
pam over them in ailenc-d tbis wae the main thing required to 
check she mass contugian of seditions actions. Finally, such a move 
mmt in the navy matured that it becams impossible either to hush 
it up or to paas over it in silence, notwithtanding the aeverity of 
I1 
the German military primn rggime, elaborated with unheard-of 
mteness and followed with unbelievable pedantry. 
There is no room for doubts. We are on the threshold of a 
world proletarian revolution. And since we, R w s h  Bolaheoiks, 
alone out of all the proletarian internationalistn of all countrim, 
enjoy comparatively great freedom, since we have aa open party, 
a score or so of p a p a ,  since we have on our side the Soviets of 
Workers' and SoIdhm' Deputies in the capitale, since we have on 
our aide the majority of the m m s  of the people in revolutionary 
times, ro us may and must truly apply the famous dictum: he who 
bas h given much shall have to  account for more. 
II 
In R h ,  the tnrning point in the revolution has undoubtedly 
come. 
In a peasant country, d e r  a revolutionary republican govern- 
ment enjoying the support of the Socidist-Revolutionary and 
M d e v i k  Parties that only y d a y  hdd sway among the petty- 
bourgeois democracy, rr peasant uprising is growing. 
It is incredible, but it is a fact 
We Bolsbevike are not surprised by Lie fact; we have aIwaps 
maintain4 that the government of the famed "coalition" with the 
boi~rgeoisie L a government of betruyd of democracy and revolu- 
tion, a government of imperialist slaughter, a government gmrding 
the capitalists and landowners against the people, 
Thanks to the deceptions of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, there baa 
been and atilf r e d m i  in Ruwia, under a qubIic and dating a 
revolution, a government of capitalhs and landownera eide by eide 
with the Soviets. Such is the bitter md formidable reality. Is 
there any wonder that at the time when the prolongation of the 
imperialist war and its consequences are causing the people unheard- 
of misery, a peasant uprising has begun and is developing? 
l a  it any wonder that the opponents of the Bolsheviks, the leaders 
of the ofEciaI S.-R. Party, the same party that mpported dm 
'%oaIition" all along, the same party that up to the Irtilt days or 
last weeke had the majority of the people on its side, the same 
@arty that continua to bIame and to hound the "new" S.-R's who 
have r e a l i d  that the coalition poIicy is betraying the intereet of 
the peaaantgie it any wonder that them leaders of the official S.-R 
19 
Party, In an editorial of theh official organ, the Dreb Narodu, I 
October 12, wrote as follows: I 
-  
Almost notbg has baa dona up to the prssent time to da away with tho I 
bDndagc phtions that atill prevail in the village, particdarly in Central 
R d a .  . . . The law regulating the land relations in the village, a law that 
has long been introduced into the Provisional Government, and ban men- 
& h e  purgatory of the Judicial Canferenoe, h a  beerr hopelessly buried 
in some quagmire of a b w u .  . . . Are wt not right in d g  that o m  
republican government i s  far from having frced itself of the old habita of 
the T d a  administration, that the dead grip of Stolypin is atill strongly 
felt in the methods of the d u t i o n a r y  Ministwe? 
This is written by the &cia1 5.-R.'s! Just think of it: the ad- 
herents of a coalition are farced to admit that, in a peasant cam, I 
sevm montha after the revolution, "almoat notbing h a  been done 
to do away with the bondage relations" of the peasants, with their 
being malaved by the landowners! Thae 3.-R.'s are forced to call 
their colleague Kerensky, and all his band of Ministers, Stolypinists. 
Can them be found more eloquent testimony coming from the 
camp of our opponca& to corroborate not only the fact that the 
coalition bas colIapaed, not only the fact tbat the ofi ial  S.-R's 
who tolerate Kerensky have become au dnutbnd ,  &peawrit, 
counter-retrohdonury party, but aho  that the whole R u m h  &YO. 
lution haa reached a turning point? 
A peasant uprising in a peasant country qainst the government 
of Kerensky, the S.-R, of Nikitin and Gvmdev, the Membvika, and 
other misterg representatives of capital and of the Iandowners' 
iatwests! A euppresaion of this uprising by the republican govern- 
ment with rngitury meadttres! 
In the face of such facts can one be a conscientious partisan of the 
proletariat and at the m e  time deny that the crisis has matwed, I 
that the revolution ia going through ita greatest turning point, that 
the victory of the government over the peasant uprising at the p ~ t  
time would be the death knell of the revolution, the h a 1  triumph 
of Kormiloviam? 
It k self-evident that if matters have reached ttme point of a 
peasant uprising in a peasant country after wven months of a 
democratic republic, this proves beyond dispute that the revo1ution 
is suffering a collapse on a national scale, that it is p d g  through 
l a  
a crisis of unheard-of severity; that the counter-revolutionary forces 
are approaching the hat ditchdcJb 
This is self-evident. In the face of such a fact as the peamt  
uprising, all the other political eymptoms, even if chey were to 
contradiet this maturing of a national crbi wouId have no signs- 
a c e  whatsaever. 
But all the symptom, on the contrary, indicate just U a t  
the country-wide c h i s  has m a d .  
After the agrarian qumtion, the national qumtion is of the pa te s t  
importance in the national life of Rue&, particu1arly for the petty. 
bonrpin masaree of the population. And we see that at the "Demo- 
cratic" Coaferenca packed by Messrs. Tsereteli and Go, the %- 
tional" curia take the second place in radicalism, gieldiag only to 
the trade d o n e  and emesding the curia of the Soviets of Workers' 
and sol dim^' Deputies by percentage of votee cast againsi the coali- 
tion (40 out of 55). 'ItPte gwemmmt of Kmmky,  a government 
mppreasiag the p a a n t  uprising, is withdrawing the revolutionary 
troops from Finland, in order to stmnghen the reactionary Fin- 
nhh bourgeoisie. In the Ukraine, the canflicb of the Ukrainians in 
general and of the Ukrainian troops in particular, with the govern- 
ment are becoming more frequent. 
Let US further Iook at the army, which fn war time is of amp 
tional importance in the whole life of the state. Ws have sem that 
the Finnish army and the Mtic k t  have entirely spla away from 
the government. We hear the testimony of the officer Dubamv, not 
a Bolshevik, speaking in the name of the whole front, and saying 
ia a more revolutionary manner than the Bolsheviks that the sol- 
diers will not fight any longer. We hear governmenta1 reports 
~ y i n g  that the morale of the soldiers is Iow, that it is i m p o d l e  
to guarantee "order" (LC, participation of these troops in supprwa- 
h g  the peasant uprising). We witness finally the vote in Moscow 
where fourteen thowand out of seventeen thousand  oldier re voted for 
the BoI&wiks. 
Thiar voting in the elections to the borough councils in Moscow 
is one of the most striking symptoms of a very deep change taking 
place in the general mood of the nation. It is generally known 
&at Moscow ia more petty-bourgeois than Petrograd. It is a fact, 
many timep corroborated and undisputed, that the Moscow prob  
tariat has a vastly greater number of conne~tiona with the village, 
that it harbours mom sympathies and ir, c1oeer to the v t  vil- 
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fnge miment, than the Petrograd proletariat. And In Moscow the 
votes cast for the S.-R.'e and Mensheviks dropped from 70 per cent 
in June to 18 per cent at present. The petty bourgeoisie bas turned 
away from the coaIition; the people have turned away from it; 
there can he no doubt of this. The Cadets have incream3 their 
strength from 17 to 30 per cent, but they remain a minority, a hope- 
Iesa minority, notwithstanding the fact that they have been obvi. 
oudy joined by the "Right" S.-R.'s and the "Right*' Men&&. 
The Rzusks'ye Vyedumostn' says that the absoke number of votes 
cast for the Cadets fell from 67,000 to 62,000. But the number of 
votes cast: for the Bolsheviks grew from 34,000 to 82,000. They 
received 47 per cent of the total number of votes. There can be 
not the shadow of a doubt that, together with the Left S.-R.'a, we 
have at present a majority in the Soviets, in the array, and in dre 
cowry* 
Among the symptoms that aerve not only as an indication but 
have a significance in themselves, must be counted the fact that the 
d e s  of the railroad men and postal employees, which are of an 
immense general economic, political, and military importance, con- 
tinue to be engaged in a harp con&ct with the governmenb while 
ewn the Menshevik defensiata am dissatisfied with "their own" 
Minister Mikitin, and the official S.-R.'s call Kerensky-and Co. "Sto- 
lyphh." Is it not clear that such "support" given to the govern- 
ment by the Menah& and S.-R.'s has only a negative meaning, 
if any? 
Yes, the leadem of the Central Executive Committee are pursuing 
tact& whoee sole logic the defenw of the bourgeoisie md 
landowners. And there is not the slightest doubt that the Bolsheviks, 
were they to allow themselves to be caught in the trap of constitu- 
tional illusions, of "faith" in the Congress of Soviets and in the con- 
vocation of the Constituent Assembly, of "waiting" for the Congress 
of Soviets, etc.-that such Bolsheviks would prove mhembk treC 
tors to the proletarian caum. 
They would be mitors to the cause, for they would have, by their 
Chapter I V  of thin article has tbw far not been located.-Ed. 
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behaviour, h a y e d  the Gennaa tevolutionary workem who have 
Btarted s mutiny in ?he Beet. To "wait" for the Congress of So- 
viets, &., nnder such conditions means &&raying inbernutbmlima, 
betraying the cause of the internationa1 SockIist revoIution. 
For internationalism consists not in phrases, not in protestations 
of mlidarity, not in inIations, but in beds. 
The Bolshwiks would be trsitora to the pmmtryl for to tolerate 
the supprwion of !he peasant nptisiag by a government which m n  
the Dyela N u ~ d a  compares with Stolypinista means to destroy the 
whole rwoIution, to destroy it forever and irrevocably. They shout 
about anarchy and about the increasing apathy of the mas=. Why 
shouldn't the rn- be apathetic in the elections when the peas- 
antry has h e n  driven to an uprasirag, while the soalled a'revolu- 
tionary democracy" patientIy tolerates the suppmion of the pea+ 
ants by military force11 
The Balshevika would prove traitors to democracy and freedom, 
for to tolerate the suppmsion of a peasant uprising at the present 
moment ~ U I L S  to a'tlow the eIectiom to the Constituent Assembly to 
be fixed in just the m e  wllly-and even worse, more crudely--as 
the "Democratic Conferenm" and the "pre-parliament" have been 
f m d  
The crisis has matured. The whole future of the Huwian RevoIu- 
tim is at stake. The whole honour of the Bo18hevik Party is in 
m i o n .  The whole future of the international workers' revoh- 
tion for Smialism is at stake. 
The crhb has matured. . . . 
Written Octobw 12, 1917. 
[Note by Mn.-Ed . ]  
hrbliab up to here; what  follow^ ia to be &tribd among ths msmbae 
of the Central Committee, The Pttmgtad Gmmittee, the Mwrcow Committee, 
and the Sohe. 
#at, then, is to be done? We must awprechsn, tam ist, "say 
what is," admit the truth, that in our Central Cornmitt& and at the 
top of our party L e r e  is a tendency in favour of awaiting the Con- 
gem of Soviets, againss the immediate &mre of power, again& 
k immediate uprising. We must owermme thb tendency or 
opinion. 
1 0  
Otb- the Bolahdw would cwer themelves with h e  
lorever; tbey would be reduced to nothing aa a party. 
For to m h  snch a moment and to '(await" the Congress of Soviets 
is either abso l~e  idiocy or complete betrayal. 
It ia a complete betrayal of the German workers. Meed, we 
. must not wait for che begin* of their revolution ! I When it be- 
* &, even the Liberdane * will L in favour of "supporting'' it. But it 
can- begin ae long as Ktrensfcy, Kishkia and Co, are in power. 
It is a comp?ete betrayal of the peasantry. To have the Soviets 
of both c u p i d s  and to allow the upriaii  of the peasants to ba mp- 
p r e d  means to lose, a d  j d y  so, all the confidence of the peas- 
ant; it means to become in the eyes of the peasants equal ta the 
Lihrdans and other scoundreIs. 
To "await" the Congress of Soviets is a h l u t e  idiocy, for this 
means losing weeks, whereas weeks and even days now decide m y  
thing. It means timidly to refuse the seizure of power, for on No- 
vember I415 it will be impossibIe (both politically and technically, 
since the Cossrtcks will be mobilised for the day of the f o o I i i  
"appointed" ** nprieing ) . 
To "await" the Cwgrw of Soviets ia idiocy, far the Congress 
will gim nothing, it can @ue nothifig! 
The *moraI" importance? S m g e  indeed! The " i m p o ~ ' '  
of rmlutiona end negotiations with the Liberdans wsen we h o w  
that the Soviets are in favour of the peaaamts and tbat the peasant 
uprising is being suppressed!! Thus, we will reduce the Swiets 
to the role of miwabIe chatterers. First vampish KarenSy, then 
ca1I the Coogreas. 
The victory of the u p e g  is now secure for the Bolsheviks: (1) 
we can +* (if we do not "await" the Soviet Congrw) launch a 
sudden attack from three points, from Feirograd, from' Moscow, 
from the Baltic fleet; (2) we have dogans whose support is guar- 
anteed: down with the government that suppressee the uprising of 
the peasants againat the landowners! (3) we have a majority in the 
A contraction of the names of leading M e d m  Lib= and Dm-Ed. 
** To "can" the Congress of Soviets for November 2. io order to d d d e  u p ~ a  
tbs aeixtrre of pow=-is there any d8erenee butween this and a f w r i  
"appointed" uprising? Now we can aeim gowar, dsreae No& 211 gon 
will not be allowed to mim it. 
*** What has the pa* done by way of studring the lacation of the m a ,  
etc.? What has it done for the carryin# out of tbe uprising as artw? 
OnIp talk in the Central Cornmitree, e k l l  
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country; (4) complete disorganiaation of the Menshevilrs and 
S.-R.'a; ( 5 )  we are technically in a position to seize power in M w  
cow (which might even ba the one to atart, so as to deal the enemy 
a surprise blow); (6) we have showads of armed workwe and 
aoldiers in Petrograd who can eei%e once ?he Winter Palace, the 
General Staff Building, the teIepbone exchange and aU the largest 
printing e s t a b b e n k  They will not be able to drive us out from 
there, whereas there wiU be such propaganda in the army that it 
wit1 be impossibk to fight against this government of peace, of 
land for the peasantar, etc. 
If we were to attack at once, soddenly, from three points, in 
Petrograd, Moarcow, and the Baltic fleet, there are ninety-nine out of 
a hundred &an= &at we would gain a victory with fewer victim 
than on July 16-18, becam the troop8 will raot advance against the 
government of peam. Even if Kerensky has d r d y  "loyal" cay- 
alry, etc., in Petrograd, when we attack from two eides and when 
the army is in sympathy with us, Kerensky will be compelled to 
surrender. If, with chances like the present, we do not ~ e k  power, 
hen all talk of Soviet rule becomes a lie. 
To refrain from seizing power at present, to "wait,n t, " & a W  
in the Central Committee, to conhne ourselves to "fighting for the 
organ" (of the Soviet), to "fighting for the Congress," meam to 
ruin the rwol&'on. 
S n g  that the Central Committee has left even withmi an 
answer my writings imiithg on such a policy since the beginning 
of the Democratic Conference, that the Central Organ is dekting 
from my articles referen- to such glaring errors of the BoUeviks 
as the shameful decision to &I the pre-parliament, as 
giving seats to the Mensheviks in the Pmidium of the Soviets, etc., 
etc-seeing all hat, I am compelled to recognise here a "gentle" 
hint as to tbe unwillingnese of the Central Committee even to con- 
sider this qu&on, a gentle hint at gagging me and at suggating 
that I retire, 
I am compelled to tender my resigndon from the Central Corn 
miuee, which I hereby do, leaving myself Dhe freedom of propaganda 
in the bwer  rorrks of the party and at the Party Conpas. 
For it is my deepemt conviction that if we "await" the Congrass 
of Soviets and let the present moment paw we ruin the revolution. 
P.S. A d o h  seriea of fa- has proven that even the k c k  
troop wiH not move againat the gwefnment of peace! And how 
many are they? Where are they? And will not the entire army 
delegate unita in our favour? 
C h a p b ~  1-IU a n d  V, pubuahed in the Rabocliy Put, No. 30, October 20, 
1917. Qlapttr VI pablhhod in 1925. 
A IElTIR TO BOISHEVIK COMRADES PARTICIPATING IN 
THE REEIONAL CONGRES OF THE SOWETS OF THE 
NORTHERN REGION 
COMRADES! Our revolution is passing through a highly critical 
time. crisiar coincides with the great criair of a growing world- 
wide SociaIim revolution and of a struggle against it by world 
imperialism. The responsible leaders of our party are confronted 
with a gigantic task; if they do not carry it out, it will mean a 
total colhpae of the iate~nationalii proletarian movement. The 
situation is such hat  delay truly means death. 
h k  at the international sitnation. The growth of an interna- 
tional revolution is beyond dispute. The outburst of indignation 
among the C z d  wokera has been r u p p r d  with unbelievable 
bmtality, which indicates that the government is extreme1y fright- 
ened. In Italy thing& have come to a mass upheaval in Turin. 
Moet important, however, is the mutiny in the German navy. 
You must picture to yourselves the enormous diEculties of a revo- 
lution in a eormtrp lilre Germany, especially under the present 
circumstances,. It cannot h doubted that the mutiny in the German 
navy is a eign of the great crisis of the rjsihg world revolution. 
While our chauvinists who preach Germany's defeat demand a aud- 
den ri- of the German workers, we Ruaeian revolutionary in- 
ternationalists know from the experience of 1905-1917 that one 
cannot imagine a more imposing sign of a rising revoIutioa than 
a mutiny among the mops. 
Think of what position we now find ourselves in before the Ger- 
man revolutioniarta. Thev can tell us, UWe have one Liebknecht 
who openly calIed for a revolution. Bi voice has been stifled 
behind iron bars. We have not a single paper a p l y  to bring out 
the n e e d y  of a revohtion; we have no freedom of assembly. We 
have not a aingle Soviet of Workers' or Soldiers' Deputies. Our 
voice hardly reaches the red broad masses. Still, we have made 
an attempt at upriaig, havhg perhaps one chance in a hundred. 
BU; you, Russian revolutionary internationalists, have behind you 
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half a year of free propaganda; yon have a more of papwe; 
you have a number of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Depu- 
ties; yon have gained the upper hand in the Sov ia  of botb capitals; 
you have on your side the entire BaItic fleet and all the Ruaeian 
troop in Finland, and dl1 you do not respond to our call for an 
uprising, you do not overtbrow your imperialist Kerensky when you 
have ninkty-aiae chances in a hundred of seeing your uprising 
victoTious." 
Yes, we shall be real betrayera of the International i& at such 
a moment, under such favourable conditions, we reply to such a 
call of the German revolutionists by mere reaolutiana. 
Add to it &at we all h o w  perfectly d l  of the rapid growth 
of plotting and conspiracy of the international imperialists agamst 
he Russian Revolution. To stifle it at any price, to stifle it both 
by military meamwee and by a peace at the expenee of Russia-& 
is what international imperialism approaches ever closer. This ia 
what particularly gharpeas the crisis of a world-wide Socia l i~  revo- 
lntioi; this is what renders our h&tancy in the matter of an upris- 
ing particnlarIy dangerous-1 would ahoat say criminal. 
Take, further, the internal situaGon of R d .  The b a n h p k y  
of the petty-bourgeois conciliation parties that exprw the uncon- 
wious confidence of the masees in Kerenaky and the imperialists in 
general, ia an obvious fact, Tbat h h u p t c y  is complete. The 
voting of the Soviet delegation at the Democratic Conference against 
a coalition, the voting of a mujo* of local Soviets of Pmsant 
Deputim fin spite of their Central Soviet where the Avksentyeve and 
other friends of h e n s k y ' s  are seated) against a coalition, the elec- 
tions in Moscow where the working population is closest to the 
peasantry and where over 49 per cent voted for the Bolarhevika (and 
among tbe soldiers fourteen out of seventeen housand)--doesn't 
alI this mean a total collapse of the confideace of the massea of the 
people. in Kerensky and tbe conciiiatora headed by Kerensky and 
Co.? C m  you imagine &at tbe m a w s  of the peopIe could say 
still more clearly than they said to the Bolahevike by this vote, 
"Lead us, we'll follow you"? 
And we, having thus won the majority of the masses of the people 
to our side, baving conquered tbe Sovid of both the capit&, shaU 
we wait? What for? Wait till Kerensky and his K o d o v i e t  
generals deliver Petrograd to the Germana, thus entering, directly 
or indirectly, openly or covertly, into a conspiracy both with 
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Buchanm and WiIbelm to completely stifle the Russian RevoIntioa? 
That the people, by the Moscow vote and by the reelections to 
the Soviets, have expressad confidence in us, is not the whole story, 
There are signs of a growing apathy and bd8erence. This is easily 
understood. It means, not an ebbing of the revolntion, aa the Cadets 
and their henchmen declare, but an ebbiing of confidence in reeolu- 
t ion~ and electiom In a revolution, he masea demand of the lead- 
ing parties action, not words; victories hi the strsggle, not talk. 
The moment is drawing near when the opinion may develop among 
the people that the BoIiwiks are no better than the others, since 
they do not know how to act when conlidem in them is ex- 
pressed. . . . 
Throughoat the whole country, the pasant uprising is flaring 
up. It ia perfectly clear that the Cadets and their sateILites are 
minimising it in every way, reducing it, as they do, to "pogroms" and 
4 t  anarchy." This lie is refuted by the fact that, in the centres of b 
uprising, the land i given over to the peasants; never have "po- 
groms' and "anarchy" led to euch splendid political results! The 
tremendous power of the peasant uprising ia proven by the fact tha 
both the cwciIiatora and the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Dye& 
Narada, and even Breshko-Breshkovskuya have begun to speak of 
, giving the land to the peasants, in order to stop the mowmeat before 
I it has engulfed them. 
Shall we wait until the h c k  mita of the Kornilovist Kereneky 
(who jwt now baa been exposed as a Kornilovist by the S.-R.'a 
themselves) have d e d  in suppressing thia peasant uprising 
pkcentecrl? 
It seems that many leaders of oar party have not noticed the 
specific meaning of &at slogan which we a11 recog&d and r e  
peated without end. This slogan is, "MI Power to the Soviets." 
There were periods, there were moments during a half year of revo- 
lution, when this slogan did not mean uprising. Those perioda and 
thoee momenta seem to hava blinded some of our comradea and 
made them forget that, at preeent and for us, at lmst b@mhg from 
the middle of September, thb slogan is zantamaun6 to a d l  so 
uprising* 
There can be not the shadow of a douh about thie. The Dyelo 
Narada recently explained this "in a popular way" when it said: 
'Kereasky will never submit!" Of couw not! 
I The slogan, "AU Power to the Soviets!" is nothing but a call to aa 
nprfeing. The bhme will fall on as, fully and unmnditionally, 
if we, who for months hve called the masses to uprising, to re 
padiating conciliation, fail to lead thorn ma- to an uprising on 
the eve of a collapse of the revolution, after the maswar have ex- 
p d  their confidence in us. 
The Cadets and condiatcrrs try to scare us with the example of 
July 16-18, with the growth of Black Hundred propaganda, etc. 
3til1, if any miataZre was made on July 26-18, it was only that we 
did not &ze power. I think &at this was not a mistake at that 
time, for at that time we were not yet in ti majority; at present, 
however, this would be a fatal mistake, i t  would be worse than a 
mistake. The growth of Black Hundred propaganda is easily under- 
stood as a sharpening of the extremes in the atmosphere of a de- 
veIoping proletarian and pmsant revolution. But to make of this an 
argument against an uprising is ridiculous, for the impotence of 
the Black Hundreds, bribed by the capitalists, the impatence of de 
Black Hundred8 in the struggle, d w  not even require any proof. 
In a struggle, Kornilov and Kerensky can have the support only of 
the "Wild Divizlion" and *the Cosaacka At present, demoralisation 
bas set in a h  among the Coma&; U e s ,  the peasants are threat- 
ening them with civil war within their Cossack territories. 
X am writing thew l i n a  on Sunday, October 21. Yon will read 
them not earlier than October 23. 1 have heard from a com- 
rade that people travelIing on the Warsaw railroad say, " K e r d y  
is leading the Cosaacka to Petrograd"! This is perfectly plaudIe,  
and it wiIl be our direct fault if we do not verify it camfully and 
stady the strength and the distribution of the Kornilwist koops of 
the second dm/#. 
Kerendiy has again brought the Kornilovist troops before Petro- 
grad in order to prevent the passing of power to the Soviets, in order 
to prevent the immediate offer of peace by this power, to prevent 
giving the whde land to the peasantry immediately, in order to 
deliver Petrograd to tbe Germans while he himself runs off to Mos 
cow! This is the eIogan of the uprising which we muet circulate ae 
wideIy as possible and which will have tremendous success. 
We must not wait for tbe AIl-Ru&an Congress of Sovie,  w h i i  
the Central Executive Committee may postpone till November; we 
muat not tarry, meanwhile allowing k e n s k y  to bring up still more 
Kornilovist troopa Finland, the fleet, and Revat are represented at 
the Congress of Soviets. Thorre, together, can bring about an im- 
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mediate movement tawarda Petmgrad and .againat the Komiloviat 
regimen& a movement of the fleet, the artillery, the machine guaa 
and two or three army corps, such as have proven in Vyborg all 
their hatred for the Kornilovbt generals with whom Kerenaky is 
again in collusion. 
It would be the greateat error if we failed to seize the oppor- 
tunity to bmak up at once the Kornilovist regiments of the second 
draft, for fear that, in leaving for Petrograd, the Baltic &et might 
expose the front to the Germans. The slanderous Kornilovists will 
my this, as they will tell any lie at all, but it is not worthy of 
revolutionists to be frightened by lies and slander. K e r d y  will 
deliver Petrograd to the Germans, &is is now a? clear as daylight; 
no assertion to the contrary can shake our full conviction that it is 
ao, because it followa from the en& course of events and from all 
of Kerendcy's policies. 
Kerenaky and the Kornilovh will deIiver Petrograd to the Ger- 
mans. In order to save Petrograd, Kerensky muat be overthrown 
and power must be &id by the Sovim of both c a p h b  These 
Soviets will immediately offer peace to all the peoples and thereby 
fulfil their duty More the German revolutionists; they will thereby 
make a decisive step toward5 frustrating the criminal conspiracies 
against the Russian holution, the conspiracies of international 
imperialism. 
Only the immediate movement of the Baltic fleet, of the Finnish 
troopq of Reval and Kronatadt against the Kornilovist tzoops near 
P&ograd, is capable of saving the Russian and the world revolu- 
tion. Such a movement has ninety-nine chances in a hundred of 
bringing about withi a few days the surrender of one section of the 
Coseack troops, the deetrnction of another section, and the over- 
throw of Kerensk~, since the workers and the eoldisrs of both 
capitals will support such a movement. 
Delay means death. 
The slogan, "All Power to the Soviets!" is a dogan of uprising. 
Whoever wea this slogan without meaning uprling, without con- 
sidering npriaiag, let him bIame himself. W e  must be able to treat 
uprising aa an art-n this I insisted during the Democratic Con- 
ferenw, on thia I insist now, because this is what Marxism teaches 
us, this is what the present situation in Russia and in the whob 
world teach- us. 
It is not a question of voting, of attracting the "Left Socialist- 
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Revolutionarim? of gaining additional provincial Soviets, of hotd- 
mg the congress. It ia a weetion of an uprising which can and 
must be decided by Petrograd, Mowow, Helaingfors, Cronstadt, 
Vyborg and RevaI. Near Petrogrod and in Petrograd-this b where 
thia uprising can and must be decided upon and carried out as 
earnestly as pwible, with as much preparation as ~ ~ 1 e ,  as 
quickly as possible, as energetically as poesible. 
The fleet, Gonatadt, Vybarg, Reval, can and must advance on 
Petrograd, crush the Kornilov regiments, arouse huh capitals,  tart 
a maw agitation for a power which would immediately give the land 
to the peasants, immediately offer peace, overthrow Kerensky's gov- 
ernment, create such a power. 
Delay means death. 
Wriuen October 21, 1917. 
Fit published No& 7,1925, in h & r ,  No. 25!5 (3186). 
LETTER TO COMRADES 
COMRADES, the time we are passing through ia no critical, events 
msh with such incredible a w i f m  that a publicist, placed by the 
wiII of fate somewhat aaide from the main stream of history, can- 
scantly risks either being late or proving uninformed, especially if 
his writing appear in print after a l a p  of time. Though real- 
bing this fully, I am still f o r d  to address this Ietter to the BaI- 
sheviks, even nnder the risk that it may not be published at all, for . 
the vacillationa against which I deem it my duty to warn in the most 
decisive manner are of an unprecedented nature and are capable 
of exercising a ravaging d e c t  on the party, the movement of the 
international proletariat, and the revolution. As for the danger of 
being too late, I will prevent it by indicating what information and 
of what date I po-. 
It was only on Monday morning, October 29, that I saw a comrade 
who had on the previous day participated in a very important Bol- 
shmrlt gathering in Petrograd, and who informed me in detail about 
the discussion. T6e subject of d i d o n  was the name gudon  of 
the uprising, which is also discussed by tho Sunday papers of all 
poIiti-1 trends. At the gathering there was represented all that is 
moat iduential in all branches of Bolshevik work in the capital. 
Only a most insignificant minority of the gatbering, n d y ,  dl 
in all two comrades, had taken a negative stand. The arguments 
which those comrades advanced are so weak, the arguments are 
the manifestation of aruch an aetounding confusion, timidity, and 
collapse of a11 the fundamenta1 ideas of BoIshevism and revolution- 
ary-proletarian internationalism that it is not easy to discover an 
explanation for such 8hamefuI vacillationa 'The face nevertheless 
is there, and since the xevolutionary party h(a no right to tolerate 
vacillations in such an earnest qumtion, as this littla pair of com- 
rades, who have scattered their principles b the winds, might cane  
a certain coafuaion of mind, it is necessary to analyse their a r p  
ments, to expose their vacillation; to &ow how ahmefa1 they are. 
The following bee will be an attempt at cawing out this iask 
ae 
We have no majwity among ths p p l e ,  and withoat this wndition the 
@dng & hopelm. .  . 
Men capable of a y h g  this are eiLher distorters of the truth or 
plants who at all even&, without taking the least m r m t  of the 
real: circumstanoes of the revoIution, wish to -re an advance gnar- 
antee that the Bolshevik Party has received throughout the whole 
cornby no more nor Iese than omhalf of the votes plne one. Such 
a gaarmtee histc. j hrts never proffed, and k absolutely in no 
poaitim to proffer in any revolution. To advance such a demand 
means to mock one's audience, and h nothing but a cover to hide 
one's own flight from reality. 
For reaIity shows us palpably that it was after the July days that 
the majority of the people began quickly to go over to the aide of 
the Bolsheviks. This was demonstrated first by the Septmbr 2 
elections in Petrograd, even before the Kornilov &air, when the 
BoMievik vote roae from 20 to 33 per cent in the city not including 
the suburbs, and also by the elections to the borough ~~ in 
Mowow in September, when the Bolahmik vote rose from 11 to 49% 
pex -t [om Moscow comrade, whom I saw r e a d y ,  told me that 
ths correct figure i~ 51 per cent). This was proven by the new e h -  
tioas to the Soviets. It was prwen by the fact that a majority of the 
peasant Soviets, the "Avhtyevw central Soviet notwihhmding, 
bm e x p d  i h l f  against the coaIition. To be against the coalition 
mema in prectioe to foIlow the Bolshevik Furthermore, reports 
from the front prove more and more often and &finitely that the 
soIdiers are passing en ltiasse over to the side of the Bolsheviks 
more and more decisively, in r p h  of the malicious slanders and 
attacks by the Soc ia l i s t -Revo lut io~Mevik  leadem, o h  
deputies, &., etc, 
Last, bat not lea&, the mmt outstauding f a d  m the present h a -  
tim b the reoroh oJ the pewmtty.  Here is m objective passing over 
of the people to the aide of the Bolehedm, shown not by words but 
by deeds. For, notwithstanding the lies of the bourgeois p t w  and 
its mimrable henchmen of the "vacilIahg" N m a p  Z&n and Co., 
and their wails about pogrom and anarchy, the fact ia there. The 
movement of the peasants in Tambov provine waa an uprising both 
ia the material and poIitical sense, an uprising that bas yielded 
such splendid poIitica1 d t s  ag in the first plam, permission to 
give &a land to the peasants. It is not for nothing that the S.-R 
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rabbIe, including the Dyeb Noruda, frightened by the uprising, 
now screams about the n m i t y  of giving over the lands to the 
peasants. Here is the demonstration of the cormctnea of Bolsbe- 
vism and its success, irt deeds. It h a  turned out to be impossible 
to "teach" the Bonapartiats and their lackeys in the pmparIiament 
othenvise than by means of an uprising. 
This $B a fact. Facts are stubborn things And such a factual 
"argument" in favour of an uprising is stronger thm thousands of 
"pessimistic" evasions on the part of c o n f d  and frightened poli- 
ticians. 
If the uprising were not an event of nation-wide political 
import, the S.-R. lackeys from the pre-parliament would not be 
shouting about the n m i t p  of giving over the land to the peasants. 
Another splendid politicaI and molutionary msequence of the 
peasant uprising, as already noted in the Rabochy Pu, is the de- 
livery of grain to ,the railroad stations in the Ta&v province; 
Here is another "argument" for you, confused gentlemen, an a r p  
meni in favour of the uprising aa the only means to save the country 
from the famine that knocks at our door and from a crisis of un- 
heard-of dimensions, Whib the S.-R.-Menshevik betrayers of the 
peopIe are grumbling, threatening, writing resolutions, promising to 
feed the hungry by convoking the Constituent kssembly, the people 
are beginnmg to mIve the h a d  question Bobhevik-fashion, by re- 
belling qainst the landownere, capitalists, and speculators. 
The wonderful results of such a solution (the only real solution) 
of the bread question, even the bourgmis preM, men the RmskQya 
Volya, compeIIed to admit by way of publishing information 
to the effect that the railroad stations in Tambov province were 
swamped with grain . . . after the peasants had revolted!! 
No, to doubt now that the mjoriry of the people is following 
and wiII follow the Bolshevlh means shamefully to vacillate and 
in practiw to throw overboard all the principles ef proletarian 
revolutiouim, to renounae Bolshevism completely. 
We are not m n g  mngh m seiEe power, and the borrrgdde i s  not ~trong 
emu& to hind@ the caIling of the Constituent hembly. 
The &st pkt  of this argmmt is a simple paraphrase of d\s 
preceding argument. It does not gain in strength and convincing 
pbwer, when the confusion of its authors and their fear of the boar- 
geoisie is e x p r d  in terms of pessimism concerning the workers 
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and optimism concerning the bourgeoisie. If the military cadet3 
and the Cuesachi say that they will fight against the Bolsbevib to 
the last drop of their blood, thia deserves full credence; if, however, 
the w o r k  and soldiers at hundreds of meetings expm full con- 
fib= in the Bolshevilre and af6rm their readinw to stand fast for 
the passing of power to the Soviets, &en it Is ''timely'' to d that 
voting is one thing and fighting another! 
Of comm, with &is kid of argument, the uprising is Utduted." 
But the question ia, wherein does this peculiarly conceived and 
peculiarly orientated Upmhism" differ from a political shift to 
the side of the bourgeoisie? 
Look at the facts. b& the Botshevik decIarationa, re- 
peated thousands of times and now "forgotten" by our pemhbta. 
We have said thowands of times that the Soviet% of Workers9 and 
SoIdiers' Deputies are the power, that they are the vanguard of the 
revolution, that they can take power. Thousands of times have we 
upbraided the Menahevilra and S.-8,'s for phrm-mongering con- 
cerning the "pl&potentiary orgm of democracy" and at the same 
time for being ajrakl to trader  power to the Soviets. 
And what has the Kornilov affair prom? It has proven that the 
Soviets are a real power. 
And, now, after hh has heen proven by experience, by facta, we 
shall repudiate Bolshdsm, deny onreelv~, and my: we'are not 
strong enough (a1th-b we have he Soviets of both capitals and 
a majority of the provincial Soviets on the side of the Bolahevh) I ! ! 
Are these not shameful vacillations? As a matter of fa* our 
" ~ "  throw overboard the slogan of "All power to the 
Sodeta,'' though they are afraid to admit it. 
How can it be proven that the bourgeoisie is not suficient1 y strong 
ta hinder the calling of the Constituent Amembly? 
If the Soviets have  no^ the power to overhow the bourgeoisie, 
this means t h 4  the latter is strong enough to hinder the calling of 
the Constituent h b l y ,  for there is nobody to prevent it from 
doing this. To trust the promim of Kereneky and Co., to trust 
the rem1utions of the pre-parliament lackeyeis this worthy of a 
member of a proletarian party and a revolutionist? 
Not only has the bourgeoisie power to hinder the '& of the 
Constituent A d l y ,  if the present govenunent is not ovedmwn, 
but it can a h  idirectdy achieve this resnrlt by surrendering Petro- 
gad  to the Gemam, by laying the front open, by inming l& 
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outs, by sabotaging delivariea of t o o d d s .  It han been proven by 
facts that, t~ a oertain extent, the hrgeoiaie has already been do@ 
all th i~ .  That means that it is cap& of doing all this $0 drhe fdJ 
extea, if the workers and soIdiers do not overthrow it. 
The Sovieta mtmt be a &m pointed at the tample of dm govtmmemt 
with rhe damand of mmking the Conntituent ABaemblj and renouncing 
Kamilovkt p loa  
Thia is how far one of the two sad p&mbts has gone. 
He had to go that far, for to renounce the uprising means to 
renounce the slogan of "AU power to the Soviets." 
Of cotme, a slogan b "not a sanctuary"; we aU agree to that. 
But then why has no one raised the *&ion of changing his slogan 
(in the same way ar f raiaed that question after the July days) P 
W h y  be a/& to say it openly, in ~pite of the fact that the question 
of the uprising, which ia now W i s p e m b k  for the realisation of the 
dogan, "All power to the Soviets," has been discussed in the party 
IB- S e p t h ?  
Our sad peseimista wiIl never he able to d a t e  themdm in 
this respect. A renunciation of the uprhbg is a renunciation of the 
passing of power to the Sovieta and a %ansfer" of all h o p  and 
expectations to the kind bourgeoisie, which haa "promised" to con- 
voke the Constituent Assembly. 
I it so &ult to understand that once power in in the hands of 
the Soviets, the Constituent A d l y  and ih success ire guaranteed? 
The Bolsheviks have mid so thousands of time. No OM bas ever 
attempted to refute this. Everybody has r e c o p i d  m& a "Cam- 
bind type," but to gmuggIe in a renunciation of giving the power 
to the Sovids under the guise of the words "combined type,' to  
smuggle it in secretly while fearing to renounce our dogan openly 
-what is &is? Can one find a p s r b t a r y  expreaeion to char- 
amiss  it? 
Some one baa very pointedly retorted to w r  phbt: "A rn 
volver without bullets?" If so, it means directly going over to the 
Lixdaas, who have declared the Soviets a "revoIvern thousmda of 
times and have deceived the people thouaan& af times. For wR& 
$hq h u e  hem in control the Soviets have proven to ba q aullitg. 
If, however, it ia a molver %i& bull ," then &it io a wIc- 
nical preparation for aa u p r k g .  For the bullet has to be p r d  
the-revolver hae to b 1011ded-d one bullet alone wouldn't lm 
enough. 
80 
Either joining the side of the Liberdans and openly renouncing 
the slogan "AU power to the S-ar," or an uprising. 
There is no middle mum. 
Tho banrgeohie cannot aturendm Petrograd to the Cermana, although 
Rodzyanko wants to, for the fighting is done not by the bonrgmkie, but by 
our heroic d o =  
Thia 'argument again reduces itseIf to the same 'bptimiam" con- 
cerning the bourgeoisie which is fatally manifested at every step by 
those who are pessimistic regarding the revolutionary forces and 
capabilities of the proletariat. 
The fighting is done by the heroic sailors, but this did not prevent 
h ~ b  admirala from dippearing before the capturn of Esel! 
This ia a fact. Facts are stubborn things. The facts prove that 
the admirals are apable of treachery no less than Kornilov. That 
General Headquarters has not been reformed, and that the command- 
ing stail is Kornilovist, are undisputed facts. 
If the Kornilovista (with Kerensky at their head, for he is aIso a 
KorniIovist) want to surrender Petrograd, they can do it in two or 
even in three ways. 
Fimt, they can, by an act of treachery of the KorniIovist com- 
manding staff, open the northern land front, 
Second, they rn "agree" concerning freedom of action for the 
entire German fleet, which is stronger than we are; hey can agree 
both with the German and with the English imperialiste. MGeover, 
the admirals who have dippeared may a h  have delivered the p h  
to the Gem- 
Third, they can, by means of lockouts, and by sabotaging the de- 
livery of foodsMa, bring our troops to complete &peration and 
impotence, 
Not a single one of them three ways can be gainsaid. The facts 
have proven that the bourgeois-Cossack party of R w i a  has already 
knocked at a11 three of the= doom, that it has siea to open a11 of 
them. 
What follows? It followa that we have no right to d until the 
bourgeoisie strang1~ the revolution. 
That Ro&ydots  wishes are no trifle has h e n  proven by expe- 
rience. R o c l q d o  is a man of &airs. Behind Rodeganko stands 
cupitat. This is beyond dispute. Capital is- a huge force aa long as 
the proletariat does not have power. Rodzyanko has carried oat the 
policies of capital, faithfully and truly, for decades, 
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What follow? It followar that to vacillate in the @on of an 
uprising as the only means to save tbe revoIurion means to sink into 
that half-liberdan, S.-R.-Menshevik cowardly confidence towards 
tbe bourgeoisie, half "peasant-l&" anquestioning confidence, against 
which the Bolsheviks have been battIing moet of alI. 
Either fold your idre arma on your empty chest and wait, white 
swearing "faith" in the Constituent M l y ,  until Rodzyanko and 
Co. have surrendered Petrograd and atrangled the revolution, or an 
uprhing. There is no middle course. 
Even tbe convocation of the Constituent Assembly, taken mpa- 
rateIy, does not b g e  anything here, for no 4tconstitutioning,* no 
voting of any arch-sovereign assembly wiII have any effect on the 
famine, or on WilheIm. Both the convocation and the success of 
the Constituent Assembly depend upon the passing of power to tha 
Soviets. This old Bolshevik truth ia b e i i  proved by reality ever 
more strikingly and ever more cruelly. 
W e  are becoming atrongu every day. We can enter tho thstitaent h e m -  
bly M a strung opposition; why ahould we stake everything? 
Thb is the argument of a philistine who has "read" that the Con- 
stituent h m b l y  is b e i i  called, and who conhdently acquiesces in 
the moat legal, most loyal, mod constitutional course. 
It k only a pity that by tacrihg for the Constituent Asswnbly one 
can solve neither the question of famine nor the question of sur- 
rendering Petrograd. This 'Ltrifle" is forgotten by the naive or the 
confused or those who have aIlowed thimwlves to be frightened. 
The famine will not wait. The peaaant uprising did not wait. 
The war will not wait. The admirab who have disappeared did 
not wait. 
Will the famine agree to wait, became we B o l s h d  proclaim 
faith in the convocation of the Conatituent Assembly? Will the 
admiraIs who have disappeared agree to wait? Will the Mak- 
Iakws and Rodzyaakos agree to stop the Iockouts and the sabotaging 
of grain deliveries, to abrogate the secret treaties with the English 
and the German imperialists? 
This is what the arguments of the heroes of "constitutional illu- 
sions" and parliamentary cretinism reduce themselves to. The Wing 
reality disappears, and what remains is only a paper dealing with 
the convocation of the Conatituent M l y ;  what remains is only 
elec t i o m  
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And blind people are still wondering why hungry people and 
soldier8 betrayed by generals and admirals are indifferent to the 
e l d o n s !  Oh, h c r e s !  
If tbs KornfIoPiate were to st@ things, then we would &OW them! But 
why should we ourstlves risk beginning? 
This is unuwa1ly convincing and unusually revolutionary. History 
d m  not repeat itself, but if we turn our back to it, and, scrutiniaing 
the fint Kor~~iIov affair, repeat: "If the Komilovists were to start" 
-if we do so, what exceIlent revolutionary ~trategy! How close it is 
to "maybe and perhaps"! Maybe the Kornilovists will  tart again 
at an inopportune time. Isn't this a ustroag" a r v t ?  what 
kind of an earnest foundation for a proIetarian policy is this? 
And what if the Kornilovists of the second draft wiII have lamed 
something? What if they wail until hunger riots begin, until the 
front is broken through, until Petrograd is surrendered, without 
beginning action till then? What then? 
What is p r o p o d  is that the tactics of the proletarian party be 
built on the poseibility of the Kornilovists' repeating one of their 
old errors! 
Let us forget all that was being and has been demon~trated by 
the BoUeviks a hundred times, all that the half year'a history of 
our revolution has proven, namely, that there is no way out, that 
there is no objective way out and can be none outside of either a 
dictatorship of the KorniIovists or a dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Let us forget this, let us renounce all thir and wait! Wait for what? 
Wait for a miracle: for the tempestuous and catastrophic course of 
events from May 3 until September 11 to be s u c d e d  (due to the 
prolongation of the war and the spread of famine) by a peaceful, 
quiet, mooth, legal convocation of the Constituent A e m b l y  and by 
a fulfilment of its most lawful decisions. Here yon have the 
"Marxiat'' tactics! Wait, ye hungry! Kereneky haa promised to 
convoke the Constituent Assembly. 
Them i s  really nothing in the international situation that would oblige 
us to act immediately; rather would we damage the muat of a Sociahit 
revolution in the Weat, if we were to allow ourselves 10 be shot 
This argument is h l y  magnificent: Scheidemann "himself," 
Renaudel "himwlf' would not be able to "manipulate" more cleverly 
tbe sympathies of the workers for the intemationa1 Socialist revo- 
lution I 
Just think of it: under ddiahly diiiidt conditions, having but 
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one Liebknecht (and at bard labour at that), without newspepsre, 
without freedom of assembly, without Soviets, with dl clasaea of 
the popdation, including every mll-todo peasant, incredibly h w  
tiIe to'the idea of internationalism, with the imprialiet big, middle, 
and petty bourgeoisie splendidly organid-the Germans, i .e, the 
German revolutionary internationalists, the German workers d r d  
in 5aiIord jackets, started a mutiny in the navy with one chance of 
winning out of a hundred. 
But we, with dozena of papers at our disposal, freedom of 'maem- 
bly, a majority in the Soviets, we proIetarian internationalists, situ- 
ated best in the whole world, ahould refum to support the German 
revolutionbts by our uprising. We should reaaon like the Scheide 
manna and Renaudela, that it is most prudent not to revolt, for if 
we are shot, then the world wiIl lam such excellent, reaeonable, ideal 
internationalists! 
Let us prove how reasonable we are. h us pass a resolution of 
sympathy with the German kurre&nbts, and let us renounce tbe 
iasurrection in Russia. This would be genuine, wasonable inter- 
nationalism. And how fast world internationalism would blw~lom 
forth, if the same wise policy were to triumph everywhere! . . . 
The war has tired out, has mangled the workere of a11 countries 
to the utmost. Oatbursts in Italy, in Germany, and in Austria, are 
homing  frequent. We aEone have Soviets of Workers' and SoI- 
diem' Deputies, Let as then keep on waiting. Let ua betray the 
German internationalists a~ we am betraying the Rnesian peasants, 
who, not by words but by deeds, by their uprising against the land- 
owners, appeal to us to riiie against Kereneky's govmmmt. . . . 
Let the clouds of the imperialist conspiracy of the capitalist8 of 
all cauntriee who are ready to &angle the R u d m  Revolution 
darken--we shall wait patientIy anti1 we are strangled by the ruble! 
Instead of attacking tbe conspiratom and breaking their ranks by a 
victory of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputieb let UE 
wait for the Constituent AwmbIy, where all international plots will 
be vanquished by voting, provided that Kerenslrp and Rodzyanko 
conscientiously convoke the Constituent A s a d l y .  Have we any 
right to doubt the honesty of K e m d y  and Rcdzydo? 
But "pmy men is a- m1 We me isolated; the Central Ex& 
Committee, the Menshmk~intetaati~ the Narayrr Z h h  peuplq and 
the Left SR's bave been h n l n g  and will h u e  a p p d  &ahst us1 
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A m m b g  argtmeat. Up to now we have been mercilessly castia 
gating the vacillators for their vacillationa, By so doing, we have 
won the sympathies of the people. By so doing, we have conquered 
the S o v i e  without which the upr is i i  could not be safe, quick, 
aure. Now let us use the Soviets which we won over in order to 
pass, ourselves, into the camp of the uacilhtors, What a splendid 
career for Bal~hevisml 
The whole of the poIicy of tbe Liberdans and Chernovs, 
and a j o  of the 'Zeft" among the S.-R.'a and Menshevik, condsts 
in d h w n s .  As an indication of the fact that the musses are 
&g to ~e Left, note that the Left S.-R's and Menshevik-intern&- 
tionalists have tremendous political importance. Two such facts as 
the p & g  of nome 4O per cent of both Men&& and S+-R's 
into the camp of the hft, on the one hand, and the peasant uprising, 
on the other, are clearly and obviansIy connectd with each other. 
But it is the Very character of this connection that reveals the 
abysmal spinelmesa of tho= who have now undertaken to whimper 
over the fact that the Central Executive Committee, which bas rotted 
away, or the vacillating Left S.-R.'s and Co., have come out again& 
us. For these vacillations of the petty-bourgeois l e a d e ~ h e  Mar- 
tow, Kamkovs, Sukhanova, and C o A a v e  to be juxtaposed to the 
uprising of the peasants. Here is a reufistic political juxtaposition. 
With whom shall we go? With the vacillating handfuls of Petro- 
grad leaders, who have indirectly e x p r d  the radicalbation of the 
masses, and who, at wry political turn, have abamefully whim- 
pered, vacillated, run to ask foqivenesa of the Liberdans, A v b -  
tyevs and Co., or with those masses that have moved to the Left? 
The, and only thnr, can the paestion be stated. 
Because the peasant uprising has been betrayed by the Martow, 
Kamkms, and Sukhanovs, we, the workers' party of   evolutionary 
internationnlista, are asked also to betray it. This is what the policy 
of "nodding" to the Left S.-R.'s and Men&evik-internationalists re- 
duces itself to. 
But we have said: to help the vacillating, we must stop vacillat- 
ing ourselves. Those ' l o ~ e ~ y "  L f t  petty-bourgeois dernwrata in 
their vacillations have even e y m p a t h i  with a maIition! In the 
long run we succeeded in m a b g  them follow us became we our- 
selvas did not vacillate. Lie has vindicated us. 
These gentlemen by their vacillations have always been ruin- 
the revolution. We alone have saved it. Shall we now shrink 
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back, when the famine is knoclring at'the gates of Petrograd an& 
Rodzyanko and Co. are preparing to surrender it? 
But we have not even fim ccmnc~tiona with the railwaymen and the paetal 
employees. Their a&id repmmtativss ~ r s  the Plan- And can we pptn 
withont the post o&e and without raiIroads? 
Yes, p i ,  Plansons bere, Lhtdans there. What confidence have 
the mmses shown them? Is it not we who have kept on pro* that 
those leaders letrayed the nao4je~? Was it not from those lsaders 
that the maam turned towards us, both at the elections in Momw 
and at the eIectiona to the Soviets? Or doesn't the mass of railroad 
and p o d  empIoyees starve? Nor strike against Kernsky and Go.? 
"Did we have connectionar with &ex unions before March 12?n 
one comrade asked a pessimist. The latter replied by pointing out 
that the two revoIutions were not comparable. But this reply only 
strengthens the position of the one who asked the qumtion. For it 
is the Bolshevilrs who have spoken thousands of times about a pro- 
longed preparation of the p r o l e t a h  revolution against fie bur -  
geobk (and they have not spoken about it, in order to forget it on 
the w e  of uhe decisive moment). It is the very sepuraiion of the 
p r o l ~ n  elements of the masses from the petty-bourgeois and 
bourgeoirr upper layer that characterisss tbe political and economic 
life of the unions of postal ernployeea and railwaymen. What mat- 
ters is not necessarily to mure  beforehand m connection^'^ with o m  
or the otber union; what matters is that only a Pictory of a prole- 
tarian and peasant uprising curt satisfy the musses both of the army 
of railwaymen and of gosta1 and telegraph employees. 
Them is enough bread in Petrograd for two or three days. Can we give 
b-d to the haurreutionists? 
One of a thousand skepticat remarks (the skeptica can ulwuys 
"doubt," and m o t  be refuted by an* but experience), one 
of those remarks that put the burden where it does not belong. 
It is Rodzyanko and Co., it is precisely the bourgeoisie that is 
preparing the famine and speculating an etrangling the revolution 
by famine. There is no escaping the famine and there can be mone 
outside of an uprising of the peasants against the landomem in the 
village and a victory of the workers over the capitalists in the cities 
and in the centre Outside of this it is impossible eitber to get grain 
from &E rich, or to transport it despite their sabotage, or to break 
the resistance of the eormpt employees and the capitalist profiteers, 
or to mtab2ish strict accounting. This has been proven by the his- 
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tory of the stlpply organisatiom, of the efforts of the udemocraq" 
that has comp&ed millions of times against the aabotage of the 
capitalists, that har whimpered and supplicated. 
Tbere ia no power on earth outside the power of a victorious 
proletarian revolution that would pass from wmpIaints and begging 
and tears, to reuohtionary action. And the Ionger tire proletarian 
revolution is delayed, the Ionger it h protracted by events or by 
the vacillations of the wavering and confused, the more victims it 
wilI cost and the more difficult it wiI1 be to organ& the transpor- 
tation and distribution of  foodstuff^^ 
"Delaying the uprising means death"-* in what we have to 
answer to thoere having the sad "murage" to Iook at the growing 
economic ruin, at the approaching famine, and atill dissuade the 
workers from the uprising (W is, perslcade them m d, and still 
p h e  canI;aence in th bourgeoijk) . 
Thure i a  nu danger in the situation at the front either. Even if the aoldiers 
conclude a wuce by themaelyea, there is stin no calamity in that. 
But the soldiers wiI1 not conclude a truce TKi requir~ state 
power, which cannot be obtained without an uprimng. The soldiera 
will dmply run away. Reports from the front teIl &at. It is im- 
pomiible to wait without the risk of aiding a collusion between 
Rodzyanlro and Wilhelm and without the risk of complete bnomic 
min, with the soldiers running away in masses, one  they (being 
aJready close to desperatbn) sink into absolute despair and leave 
everything to the mercy of fate. 
But if we take power, and obtain neithar a truce nar a demoerado peace, 
then the mldiws may not wi& t o  fight a mIutionary war. What hi' 
An argument which brings to mind the saying: one fool can a& 
ten times more questions than ten wise men are capable of an- 
swering. 
We have never denied the difEculties of power during an im- 
periaht war. Nevertheless, we have always preached the dictator- 
ship of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry. Shall we renounce 
this, when the moment has actually arrived? 
We have aIwayr said that the dictatorship of the proletariat in 
- 
one country createa gigantic changes in the international ituation, 
in the economic life of the country, in the condition of the army, 
in its m o o k h a l l  we now "forget" a11 this, and allow ourselves to 
be frightened by the c i ~ u l t i e s "  of the revolnrion ? 
a7 
A m m ~ r q m m , a h e m ~ a x e n o t i n a m o o d t h s c w o d d d c i v s & m  
fnto fhe streets. Among the signs justifying p&mlm may bo mentioned 
tbe unusual sprtad of rhs pogromh and Black Hundred prees. 
Whm people allow themdvcs to be frightened by the bourgeoisie, 
then all objects and phenomwa naturaIIy a p p r  yellow to them. 
First, they subtitote an impmwioni~t, inte1Iectual criterion of the 
movement for Qe Ma& one; for a political analysis of the de 
velopment of the class ~truggle and of dm murse of wenta thou&- 
oat the COW = a whole against the international background as 
a whole, they ~ t a t e  subjective impressions of moo&. That a 
h party line, its anyielding reaogve, is also a moad.creatiag factor, 
particularly in the a h p t  revoIutionay moments, they "cowed- 
ently" forget, of cause. It is sometimes very % o d e n t n  for 
people to forget that the respodle  leaders, by their wadlati- 
and by their readiness to burn their idols of yeeterday cause the 
moat unbmming vacillations in the mtxld of certain strata of the 
maEws 
Secondly--and this is at present the main thing-in apd&g 
- h u t  the mood of the masses, the spinelms people forget to add: 
that Meverybody" reports it aa a tense and expectant mood; 
that 4'everybdy" agrees ht, called upon by the Soviets for the 
defence of the Soviets, the workera will step forward as one man; 
that "everybody" agrees that the workas are greatly dissatisfied 
with the indec'ion of the centre m r n i n g  the "hd decisive 
struggle," w h a  inevitability is clearly recogaid; 
that "everybody" unanimously characterises the mood of the 
broadat mas= a# close to despair and pointa at the anarchy de- 
veloping on this very basis; and 
that "everybody" also recwisea that there is among he clam- 
conscious workers a definite unwillingness to go out into the streeta 
only for demonatrationg only for partial struggles, since the ap- 
proach of not a partial but a general struggle is in the air, while 
the hopelessness of individual strike demonstration8 and acts of 
prwKIure has been tested and fulIy understood. 
And so /or&. 
If we approach tbia c h a r a e t i o n  of the maw mood from the 
poht of view of the entire dedopment of the GI= and political 
etruggle and of the e n h  couree of events during the half year of 
88 
our revolution, it dl h o m e  dear to as how thoge p p l e  frigbb 
ened by the bourgeoisie are distorting the question. The question ' 
is not the m e  aa it was M o r e  May 34, June 22, July 16, for then 
there was a +spontmeuu excikment which wa, as a party, either failed 
to omprebend (May 3) or held back and shaped into a peaceful 
demmatrakion (June 22 and July 161, for we knew very we11 at 
that time that the Soviete were not yet ours, that the peaeante still 
trusted the ~ d a n ~ o y  and not the Bolshevik course (upris- 
ing), that consequently we collId not have back of ua the majority 
of the people, and that comquently the uprising m premature. 
At that time the question of the Iaat decisive struggle did not arise 
at all among the majority of the c1m-conecions woxkers; not one 
oat of a11 the party units would have raised that question at that 
ti-. An to the uam1ightened and very broad mmm, there war 
neither a concentrated mood nor the resolve born out of despair 
among them; there was only a spontaneous excitemem with the naive 
hope of "influencing" Kernsky and the bourgeoinie hy "action," 
by a demonstration pure and simple. 
What is n d d  for an uprising is not this, but a conrnioua, fum, 
and unswerving resolve on the part of the class-eonecious elements 
to fight to the end; this on the one band. On the other, a concen- 
trated mood of despair among the broad massea who feel that noth- 
ing can be saved now by half-measures ; that you cannot "in0u&ceY' 
anybody by merely influencing him; that the bungq wiIl "md 
everything, destroy everything, even in an anarchiat way," if tbe 
BoIahdts are not able to lead them in a decisive battle. 
It is precisely to this combination of a tense mood as a result of 
the lesbians of experience among the class-conscious elements and a 
mood of hatred tow& the lockout employers and capihIistb a 
mood close to despair among tbe broadest ma- that the develop- 
ment of the revolution has in practim brought both the workers and 
the peasantry. 
It is preckly on this basis that we can also understand the "suc- 
c d  of the scoundrels of the Mack Hundred press who imitate 
Bobheviam. That the Black Hundreds are fdl of maIicious glen 
at the approach of a decisive battIe between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat, has been observed in all revoIutiom without exception; 
this has always been so, and it is absolutely unavoidable. And if 
you aIlow yourselvm to be frightened by thh cbmmtance, then 
you have to renounce not only the uprising but the proletarian revo- 
a9 
lntion in general. For this revolution in a capitalist society mmot 
mature without being mcompsnied by maIicous glee on the part of 
the Black Hundreds and by h o p  that they would be able to feather 
their nest in way. 
The clss-conscious workers h o w  perfectly well that tbe Black 
Hnadreds work hand in hand with the bonrgmisie, and that a d e  
chive victory of the workera (in which the petty bourgeoisie does 
not believe, which the capitalists are afraid of, which the Black 
Hundreds whh out of &ex malice, convinced as they are that the 
Bolsheviks cannot retain power)-&at this victorp will utterly 
the Black Hundreds, that the Bolshevih will be able to retain power, 
firmly and to the greateat advantage of all humanity, tired out and 
made wretched by the war. 
Indeed, is them anybody in hie senses who can doabt that the 
Rodzydas and Suvorias are acting in accord, that the roles are 
distributed among them? 
Has it not been proven by facts that K e d y  acts on Rodzyanko'8 
order, whiIe the "State Printing Prm of the R u d m  Republic" ' 
(don't laugh! ) prints at the ex- of the state the Black Hundred 
a p h e s  of the Black Hundred "State Duma"? Has not this fact 
been exposed even by the IacIrep from the Dyela N o d a ,  who do 
lackey service to "one of their little ilk"? Has not the experience 
of all elections proven &at the Cadet nominations were fully sup- 
ported by the Noooye Vremyu, which is a venal paper controlled 
by the "interests" of the tsarist landowners? 
Did we not read yesterday that commercial and industrial capital 
(non-parti- capital, of course; oh, non-parthan capital, to be sure, 
for the Vikhlyayevs and Rakitniko~s, the Gvozdm and Nikitias are 
in malition not with the Cadets-God forbiLbut with the nom- 
pr&un commercial and industrial circles!) has donated the goodly 
sum of 300,000 rublee to the Cadets? 
The whole Black Hundred pms, as we look at thing from a clam, 
not from a eenthnental point of view, is a branch of the firm "Rya- 
bnsh;nskv, Milyukov, and Co." Capitd buys, on the one hand, the 
Milyukovs, Zadavskys, PO~~ESOVB, and rn on; on the other, the 
Black Hundreds. 
There is no other means of putting an end to this most hideous 
poisoning of the people by the Black Hundred plague than the 
&my- of the prokturht. 
Is it any wonder that the crowd, tired out and made wretched by 
M 
, hunger mad the proIongation of tbe war, eagerly r e a h  out for 
the Black Hundred p o b n  ? Can one imagine a capitalist ~aciety on 
the eve of a collapse without despair among the oppressed masses? 
And can the despair of the maiws, a large part of w h o m  are still in 
darkness, not express k l f  in i n m d  mnsumption of all sorb of 
poiaon? 
No; tlth pmion of those wbo, in arguing about the mood of the 
m w ,  at the door of tbe masses their own personal spineless- 
uem, is hopelesa The maseea are divided into those who conecioualg 
wait and those who unconsciousIy are ready to sink into deepair; bat 
the masm of the o p p d  and the haagry are not spineless. 
On the other band, the Mamint party cannot redoes tha qudon  of an 
uprieiag to the quention of a military conspiracy. 
Marxism ia an unueuafly profound and many-sided doctrine. It 
is, therefore, not to be wondered at &at acraps of quotations from 
Marx-qecially when the qnotationar are made inappropriately- 
can alwray~ be found among the "argamentsn of those who break 
with Marxism, A military empiracy is Blmqujm, i/ it b organ- 
ised not by a party of a definite clam, ij its organism have not 
analysed the poiitical moment in general and the international &- 
ation in particular, if the party has not on ita side the sympathy 
of the majority of the people, as proven by objeetme facts, if the 
development of evatar in the revolution has not brought about a 
~ractical refutation of the coneihtory il1udons of the petty boar- 
geoide, if the majority of the reqpiaed "plenipotentiary" or other- 
wise exprwd organa of revolutionary struggle Iike the Soviets have 
not been conquered, if there has not ripened a sentiment In the army 
(if this is going on during a war) against the government that pro- 
tracts the unjust war againa the whoIe of the people, if the ~Iogans 
of the uprising (like "All power to the Soviets," "Land to the 
peasants,'' or "Immediate offer of a democratic peace to all the 
beIligerent peoples, coupled with an immediate abrogation of a11 
secret treaties and m e t  diplomacy," etc.) have not k o m e  widely 
h w n  and popular, if the advanced workers are not msvinced of 
the despate situation of the maaae and of the anpport of the 
vilIag6 a support proven by a serious peasant uprising or by an 
upr- againat the landowners and the govemmmt that clefen& 
the landowners, if the economic situation of the country inspires 
me with earnest hops for a favourabIe solution of the crisis by 
pce8bb and pdianmkrry means. 
U 
Is thin s&cient? 
In my pamphlet entitled: Will the 'Bobheda R& S e  
P~lgtf?'' ' (I h o p  it wiII appear one of these days), I have re.- 
ferred to a quotation from Mar* which d l y  bears upon fie question 
of an upr- and d c h  mFLTmratss the featmen of an uprising ae 
an 4tart.n 
I am ready to wager tbat if we were to prop- to all &one &at- 
terera, wbo now &out h R h  a@mt a military compiracy, to 
open their month, if we were to appeal to them to explain the 
difference b e e n  the of an armed up* and a military 
conspiracy that dmemea mderrmation, they could either repeat 
what was quoted above or they would wwr thmdves with shame 
and w d d  call forth the generat ridicule of the w o r h .  Why not 
try, my dear ah-M&! Sing us a mng ag- "military con- 
Sphacf! 
P05TscRm 
The above linea had been written when I received at eight o'clock 
T u d a y  evening h e  morning Pebograd papers, with an ar&Ie of 
Mr. V. Bamrw in d e  Nmya Zbh.  Mr, Y. Bazarav aaeertn that 
"a hand-nrritten' bnlletin was distrjbuted in the city, in which argu- 
ments were pmenkd in the name of two eminent Bolshevih, against 
immediate action ." 
If this is tme, I beg the mmradea whom thia letter canwt wach 
earlier than Wednesday noon, to publish it atl quickfy as p d l e .  
I did not d t e  it for the preaue; X wanted to converse with the 
member8 of oar party by way af correspondence. But if the h e m  
of the N-a Z&, who do not belong to the party and who have 
been ridiculed by it a hundred times for their contemptibIe spine- 
lessnw (those are the elements who voted for the B o l a h d  the 
day befare yemday, for the Meneheviks yesterday, and who almost 
united them at the world-famous unity conpas), if such individuaIa 
receive a bulkin from members of our party, in which they make 
propaganda ag!inst an uprising, then we cannot kep silent. We 
muat agitate abo in favour of an uprising. Let the anonymous 
individaats finally appear in the light of day, and let them bear 
the punishment they dewme for their vacillation-en 
if it IR only the ridicule of all class-consc:ious workers. I have at 
my dieposaI only one how before 1 send the present letter to Pe~r* 
grad and I, therefore, wish to piat out only by a word or two a 
"method" of the sad heroes of the brainlw N w a y a  Zhim tendency. 
Mr. V. Bmarov attempts to polemk againat Comrade Ryazaaov, 
who has atid, and who is a thquaand timw correct in aaybg, that 
"an uprising is being prepared by all those who create in the  mas^^ 
a mood of despair and indifference." 
The sad hero of a sad cause "rejoins" as follows: 
'gave despair and indifference ever conquered?" 
Ob, contemptible little fools from the N o v a  Zhicn! Do they 
know such exampIea of uprising in history as this, when the masses 
of the oppressed classes were victorious in a desperate battle w i t h o ~  
having been brought to despair by long sufferings and by an extreme 
sharpening of all sorb of crises, when t h e  m a w s  had not been 
seized by -ind&rence towards various lackey-like pmparliaments, 
towards the idle playing with revolution, towards the reduction of 
the Soviets by the Liberdans from organs of power and uprising to 
the role of empty talking-shops? 
Or have the contemptibIe little fools from the Nwayu Zhkn per- 
haps discovered among the ma- an idifleretwe to the question of 
bread, to the proIongation of the war, to land for +e peasants? 
Written October 29-30, 2917. 
Published in Rabochy Put, N m  4-41-42, November 1, 2, 3, 1917.- 
LETTER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY 
C o ~ a ~ n E s !  
X have not had a chanm yet to receive the Petrograd papers for 
Wednday, October 31. When the full text of Kamenev's and 
Zinoviev'a declaration, pub1ishe.d in the non-party paper, the Novayo 
Z h ,  was transmitted to me by teIephone, 1 r e f w d  to believe it; 
but it is impossible to doubt, and X am compelled to take the oppor- 
tunity to transmit this letter to the members of the party by Thurs- 
day evening or Friday morning, for it would be a crime to keep 
quiet in the face of such unheard-of strike-breaking. 
The mom serious the practicaI problem, and the more responsible 
and Uoutstaading" the persons committing tbe strike-breakbg, the 
more dangerous it is, the more decisively must the atrike-breakera 
be thrown oat, the more unforgivable it would be to hesitate even 
in view of past ' ' d c e s n  of the strike-breakers. 
Ju& think of it! It is known in party circles that the party has 
been d i a c d g  the queation of the uprising since September. NO- 
body has ever heard of a singIe letter or leaAet by either of these 
p~ions!  Now, on the eve, we may say, of the Congress of Soviets, 
two ontstanding Bolilhmib take a stand against the majority, and, 
obviously, ugaa'wt the Central Committee. They do not say this 
directly; and therefore tbe darnage to the cause is ail1 greater, for 
it is more dangerous to e p k  by hinting. 
From the tea of Kamaev's and Zinoviwt declaration it ia per- 
f d y  cleat that they have taken a stand against the Central Com- 
mittee, for otherwise their d~laration would be &surd, however, 
hey did not say which decision of the CentraI Committee they 
disputed. 
W h y ?  
Quite obviously: h a u s e  it has not beem published by the Cen- 
tral Committee. 
What is it, then, &at we have here? 
'Dealing wi& a bnrning problem of the highest importturce, OD 
& 
the eve of the critical day of November 2, two "outstanding &I- 
&&'' attack an unpublished decision of the party centre in the 
non-party press, in a paper which as far aa this given problem ia 
concerned, goes hund in h a d  wirh the bourgeoisie khe 
workerj' party! 
Obviously, this ia a thousand timw meaner and a million times 
more hmfd than were all the writings of Plekhanw in the nm- 
party prwi in 1906-1907, which were so sharply condemned by the 
party! But at that time it was a q u d o n  only of elections, whiIe 
now it is a question of an uprising for the potpose of conquering 
power! 
And with such a question before us, ajser the centre has made 
a decision, to dispute thia unpublished decision before the Rods 
yankos and Keren*s in a non-party pap-an one imagine an 
action more treacherous, more strike-breaking? 
X would conalder it a shame if, in consequence of my former 
dm- to thme former comrades, I were to hesitate to condemn 
them. I aay outright that I do not consider them comrades any 
longer, and that I wiU fight with all my powers both in the Central 
Committee and at the oongreehl to expel them both from the parry. 
For a workem' party, which life conftonta ewer more often with 
an npridq, cannot solve this =ult problem if unpublished da- 
cieions of the centre, after they have been accepted, are diputed 
in the non-party pr- and vaci1lations and canfusion are biought 
into the ranks of the fighters. 
Let the gentlemen, Zinoviw and Kammev, found their own party 
out of dozene of peopIe who have grown confused, or out of candi- 
dates for the Constituent A d I y .  The workers will not join such 
a party, for ita first slogan will be: 
"Members of the Central Committee, defeated at tbe m&g of 
the Central Committee on the question of decisive conflict, may go 
to the non-party press to make attacks tbere on the nnpublishd 
d d o n r  of the party." 
Let them buiId such a party for themselvep; our party of Bol- 
sheviks will only gain from it. 
When all the documents are published, the strike-breaking activi- 
ties of Zinoviev and Kamenw will stand out stiU more clearly. In 
the meantime Iet the following question engage the attention of the 
workers: 
'Zet ua assume &at the administration of an all-Rdan trade 
M 
union hm deoidd, after a =&'I dellbsratioa and with a majority 
of over eighty per cmt, that it b to prepare for a sarike, 
without, however, publishing in the meaahe  the date or anything 
eIse. Let US, W m ,  amanme that, a+ the &&ion, two membws 
d e r  the hauchtlent pretext of a 'diiamhg opkioqn have not only 
hgm to write to the local group q j h g  a m o d h a d m  d ths 
decision, but that they have also allowed thair letters to ba cam. 
municated to the mn-party p a p .  h ha&, amme that &ey 
thmdvea have in the non-party papers attacked this decision, al- 
thongb it has not been published as yet, and tbat they have bsgan 
to denounce the strike before the eyes of the mpitdish w d d  
the workers hesitate in expelling from their midst such 
breakers?" 
As to how the u p N i  question &an& now, ao nGar to N- 
ber 2, I cannot judge from afar how much damage was done to the 
cause by the strike-breaking action in the non-party p m  Vwy 
great precsiwl damage has undonbtedlp h a  c a a d .  To m m d y  
the situation, it b first of all neceesary to re-embllisb the tmity of 
the Bolshevik front by excluding the etrike-breakers. 
The weaknw of the ideo~ogik arguments against the upidq 
will be the clearer, the more we drag them out into the open. I 
have recently writtan an article about this in the Rabochy Art, and 
if the editors do not h d  it poaaible to put it in the paper, the 
members of the party will probably get acquainted with it from the 
manuwript. 
These so.cal1ed Uideolgical" arguments reduce themselves to the 
following two. First, they say, it is necessary to "Wait" for the 
Constituent Assembly. Let as wait, they say, maybe we will bold 
out-thia is the whole arpmat .  M a y b  despite famine, despite 
economic ruin, despite the fact that the ddiera' patience is ex- 
hausted, despite ~~dzyanko's tep towards surrendering Petrograd 
to the Germans (even despite lock-oute), we will hold out. 
Perhaps and m a y k t h i a  is all the force of this argument. 
The mend is noisy pessimism. Under the bourgeoisie and Ker- 
en&, they my, everpthig wm going on well; with us, ever* 
will be bad. The capitalists have everything prepared wondqrfdly ; 
tha workers have everythhg in bad shape. The "pmimistr" shout 
all they can about the military aide of the matter, while the 'lo#= 
M 
mists" keep silent, for it is hardly p leamt  to anybody outside of 
the strikebreakers to reveal anything to Rodzyanko and K e r d y .  
Hard times. A grave problem. A grave betrayal. 
And stiU, the problem will be solved, the workers will become 
consolidated, the peasant uprising and the extreme impatience of the 
soldiem at the front wilI do their work! Let us c l m  our ranks more 
firmly-the proletariat muat win! 
M. Lmn. 
LETTER TO THE MEMEERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
COMRADES! 
I am writing these lines on the evening of the 6th. The situation 
k extremely critical. It is ae clear as can be that delaying the 
uprising now really means death. 
With all my power I wish to persuade the comrades that now 
everything bangs on a Lair, that on the order of the day are ques- 
tions fist are not solved by canference~, by congresares (even'by 
Congresses of Sovieb), but only by the people, by the masses, by 
the struggle of armed masses. 
The bourgeois onslaught of the Kornilovists, the removal of Ver- 
khovsky show that we muat not wait. We must at any prim, this 
evening, tonight, arrest the Ministers, having disarmed (defeated if 
they offer resistance) the military cadets, etc. 
We must not wait! We may lose everything! 
The immediate gain from the seizure of power at present b: 
defence of lhe people (not the congesa, but the people, in the first 
$ace, the army and the peasants) against the Korniloviet govern- 
ment which has driven out Verkhovsky and has hatched a second 
KorniIov pIot. 
Who should wim power? 
At present this is not important. Let the Military Revolutionary 
Committee wize it, or "some other institution" which declares that it 
rdinquish the power only to the real representatives of the 
interests of the people, the interests of the Army (immediate offer 
47 
of peace), the inter& of the paamb (take the land immediateIy, 
abolish private property), the interwta of ths hungry. 
It is necmry that a11 the boroughs, all regimen@ .all f o m  
should be mobilimd and &ouId immediately send delegations to the 
Military Revolutionary Committee, to the Central Committee of the 
Bolsheviks, iasistentIy demanding that under no circmmtmc~ is 
power to be left in the hands of Kerensky and Co. u n d  the 7tb, 
by no means!-but that the matter must absolutely be decided this 
evening or tonight. 
History will not forgive delay by revolutionists who could be 
victorious today (and will surely be victorions today), while they 
risk loaing much tomorrow, they risk Iosing all. 
If we seize power today, we seize it not against the Sovieta but 
for them. 
S e h  of power i~ the point of the uprising; its politicaI task 
will be cIarified after the &re. 
It would be a disaster or formaIiam to wait for the uncertain voting 
of Nwember 7. The people have a right and a duty to decide such 
questions not by voting but by force; the people have a right and 
duty in critical moments of a revoIution to give directions to tbeir 
representatives, even their b& representatives, and nat ta wait for 
them. 
This has be& praven by the history of a11 revolutions, and the 
crime of revolutionists would be limitless if they let go the p r o p  
moment, larowing that upon them depends the staving oj f e revoh  
tion, the offer of peace, the saving of Petrograd, the ~ v i n g  from 
starvation, the transfer of the land to the peasants. 
The government is tottering. We must deal it the &at.h blow at 
any coat. 
To deIay action is the stme as death 
Writtan November 6, 1917. 
Firm pubhhed in 1925. 
WE r ik ROAD TO POWER 
--. by Joseph S'talin 
writings and mts fapm August to ~uvembcr, 1917, which 
b l e d  the way to tke dwrc of power by the Soviets. 
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